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Electronic healthcare technology is prevalent around the world and creates huge potential to 
improve clinical outcomes and transform care delivery. However, there are increasing concerns 
relating to the security of healthcare data and devices. Increased connectivity to existing computer 
networks has exposed medical devices to new cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Healthcare is an 
attractive target for cybercrime for two fundamental reasons: it is a rich source of valuable data and 
its defences are weak. Cybersecurity breaches include stealing health information, ransomware 
attacks on hospitals and potential attacks on implanted medical devices. Breaches can reduce 
patient trust, cripple health systems and threaten human life. Ultimately, cybersecurity is critical to 
patient safety, yet has historically been lax. New legislation and regulations are in place to facilitate 
change. This requires cybersecurity to become an integral part of patient safety. Changes are 
required to human behaviour, technology and processes as part of a holistic solution. 
Introduction
Healthcare technologies have the potential to extend, save and enhance lives. Technologies range 
from those providing storage of electronic health records (EHRs); devices that monitor health and 
deliver medication (including general purpose devices and wearables, and technology embedded 
within the human body); to telemedicine technology delivering care remotely - even across 
countries. Patients increasingly use their own mobile applications, which can now be integrated with 
telemedicine/telehealth into the medical Internet of Things [1] for collaborative disease 
management and care coordination. 
As healthcare devices continue to evolve, so does their interconnectivity. Whilst traditionally 
standalone, many are now integrated into the hospital network. There are currently 10-15 
connected devices per bed in US hospitals [2]. Interconnection has many benefits – e.g., efficiency, 
error reduction, automation and remote monitoring. These benefits are transforming the treatment 
of both acute and chronic long-term conditions. Interconnected technology outside of the clinical 
environment allow health professionals to monitor and adjust implanted devices without the need 
for a hospital visit or invasive procedures. EHRs can improve patient care by making health 
information more broadly available [3]. Unfortunately, interconnection introduces new 
cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Cybersecurity is concerned with safeguarding computer networks and 
the information they contain from penetration and accidental or malicious disruption. There are 
growing concerns that cybersecurity within healthcare is not sufficient and this has already resulted 
in a lack of medical information confidentiality [4] and integrity of data [5,6]. 
Of course, privacy breaches were a concern prior to the emergence of digital health records. 
However, the interconnectivity of today’s records provides multiple potential gateways to access; 
the ability to access remotely (whereas historically paper records would have been safeguarded 
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2within hospitals and only accessible via physical breaches); the ability for data theft to go unnoticed; 
and access to a more complete health record providing a more valuable resource for potential 
attacks (whereas previously health records may have been split between many different 
hospital(s)/departments). Historically, misplaced paper records or a stolen laptop may have exposed 
hundreds or thousands of patients to a potential date breach, now that this information is electronic 
and available on numerous networks, a privacy breach has the potential to affect millions of people 
[7]. To illustrate further, celebrity health records have always been a target for breaches [8]. 
However prior to the emergence of electronic records, these breaches were limited to hospital staff 
who could gain access to the physical paperwork. Now celebrity health records can be potentially 
remotely accessed – increasing the potential for breaches. That said, electronic records also have a 
key privacy benefit over paper records – the ability to track staff access (a recent report suggests 
that over half of healthcare breaches come from inside the organisation [8]). Whereas previously it 
could be difficult to detect who had a ‘sneak peek’ at paper medical records, it is often easier to 
track who has accessed electronic records. Although there are ways around this for more 
sophisticated/external attackers.
As illustrated by breaches reported in the media, cybersecurity vulnerabilities are being exploited. 
Healthcare is currently one of the most targeted sectors. Reports highlight the growth of attacks and 
the rise in medical identity theft - with millions of medical records stolen globally [9–12]. Breaches 
can arise from hacking, malware and insider threats. Hacking is defined as unauthorised access to a 
computer system to gain information or cause disruption [13]. Malware (“malicious software”) 
refers to programs designed to infiltrate computers without users’ consent and includes threats such 
as viruses and ransomware. While insider threats are issues created by the mistakes or deliberate 
actions of staff (e.g., responding to phishing emails - a social engineering attack to extract login 
credentials or to launch a malware attack, erroneous security settings, misuse of passwords, losing 
laptops and sending unencrypted emails). 
The aim of this narrative review is to explore the following questions:
1. Why is healthcare vulnerable?
2. Why is healthcare targeted?
3. What threats and consequences is healthcare currently experiencing?
4. What is the role of legislation and standards?
5. How can the healthcare sector move forward?
Method
Data sources and search strategy
The PubMed database was searched for full text, English language, peer-reviewed articles from April 
2012 to April 2018. The keywords used were cybersecurity and healthcare. This returned 2475 hits. 
Since cybersecurity is constantly changing, this was changed to 2014-2018 which reduced the return 
to 1249 articles. The bibliographies of key texts were then used to source further articles. 
Article titles and abstracts were screened by the principal researcher. Articles were retained where 
there was evidence of cybersecurity issues, clear implications for healthcare settings, organisational 
practice, individual practice or health technology development. Also included were systematic 
reviews regarding the education and behaviour of healthcare workers. Security research papers 
exploring future technological solutions were excluded as were articles relating to medical research. 
Key themes were agreed by consensus between the two researchers to limit bias.
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3Findings
The review of the literature revealed the following information relating to the research questions:
Why is healthcare vulnerable?
Traditionally people believed that no one would be motivated to attack healthcare systems and 
protective measures were not deemed necessary. No healthcare organisation exists to provide 
cybersecurity. Emphasis has traditionally – and understandably – been focused upon patient care. 
There are several issues that complicate healthcare cybersecurity and have increased vulnerability 
over time:
 Increasingly connected technology to provide efficient ways to care for patients, particularly 
with chronic conditions [14]. This provides multiple ways of connecting to medical devices 
[15]. Devices are often easily accessible which increases the likelihood that attackers will find 
them. A single device could provide a potential entry point to larger hospital networks, 
bypassing the firewalls. There also tends to be a time lag between an attack occurring and 
detection of the breach, helping to further increase vulnerability. 
 More focus on keeping patients healthy leading to more continuous patient monitoring 
outside the clinical environment [14,16]. More devices being used in the wider healthcare 
setting increases vulnerability to breaches.
 Mobile consumer devices (e.g., smartphones) being widely adopted; making it difficult to 
protect health data from risks posed by general purpose devices [14]
Alongside this growth of new technologies, many healthcare organisations are still using legacy 
systems in other areas, for example Window XP has not been supported since 2014 [17] allowing 
hackers and malware to easily avoid detection – for instance, the recent Wannacry attack [18]. The 
propriety nature of medical device software means that healthcare IT teams may not be able to 
access the internal software in medical devices, so they depend on manufacturers to build and 
maintain security in those devices (which has been lacking). 
Lack of funding for cybersecurity is also problematic, while organisations are spending funding to 
become more integrated; they are not spending enough time and money to keep software updated 
and systems secure.  This is aggravated by a lack of cybersecurity expertise within the sector 
resulting from a general lack of technology and the prohibitive expense of cybersecurity personnel 
[14,19]. 
In summary, a rapid move to electronic health records and interconnected devices, alongside 
historic and continual lack of investment in cybersecurity and a failure to understand the security 
workaround behaviours of health staff has left the health sector vulnerable to attack. 
Why is healthcare targeted?
While healthcare has vulnerabilities to exploit, attackers must be motivated to carry out attacks. 
Motivation includes the potential for financial and political gain and potentially to take lives in a 
form of cyberwarfare.  The strongest of these motivations is financial gain. Healthcare data is 
substantially more valuable than any other data. The value for a full set of medical credentials can be 
over $1000 [20]. Stolen medical identities can be used to obtain health services and prescription 
medication by assuming someone’s identity or insurance credentials. Uses extend to sophisticated 
fraud perpetrated by organized crime. Fraudsters have earned billions in the last few years by filing 
fraudulent claims and dispensing drugs to sell on the dark web [21–23]. Sometimes there is even 
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4sufficient information in medical records to open bank accounts, secure loans or obtain passports 
[24]. 
Data held within health organisations also has political value. For example, the World Anti-Doping 
Agency was attacked and the records of prominent athletes made public [25]. NHS websites are 
accessed by millions of citizens, making them a prime site for publishing propaganda, e.g., NHS 
websites were hacked by cyberterrorists and images of Syrian civil war were uploaded [26]. 
Over the past decade we have seen numerous headlines warning of the potential for medical 
devices to be used as part of a futuristic cyberwar campaign. Nation state actors could disrupt 
healthcare in a foreign country by denying access or targeting individuals through their medical 
devices, or by collecting sensitive data. 
Those with cybersecurity skills enjoy the challenge of finding and exposing security vulnerabilities in 
networks and medical devices. For example, in 2016 an individual scanning for security 
vulnerabilities was able to access a file containing data of people who had registered with the 
Australian Blood Donor service [27]. 
In summary, healthcare is targeted due to the potential for financial or political gain, or to expose 
vulnerabilities by cybercriminals, hacktivists and political activists. 
What threats and consequences is healthcare currently facing?
As of 2015, hacking has become the leading cause of health data breaches [28]. Malware including 
ransomware is also problematic. Hackers continue to take advantage of lax security to steal medical 
health records, deny access to health services or cause intentional harm. Over the last few years the 
health sector has experienced a dramatic rise in the number and size of data breaches [11,12,29]. 
Breaches result in financial loss, loss of reputation and reduced patient safety. In Australia the 
medical card number of every citizen is reportedly for sale on the dark web [30]. Ponemon Institute 
recently reported the average cost for each lost or stolen healthcare record containing sensitive and 
confidential information as $380 [31]. Ongoing publicity associated with large breaches may 
compromise patient trust which could result in less willingness to share data. This is particularly 
problematic for patients with stigmatising conditions such as sexual or mental health conditions [3].
Despite issued warnings and availability of security patches (many not installed), the scale of the 
2017 WannaCry attack was unprecedented. WannaCry infected more than 300,000 computers 
across the world demanding that users pay bitcoin ransoms [32]. Fifty UK hospitals experienced 
system-wide lockouts, delays to patient care and function loss in connected devices such as MRI 
scanners and blood storage refrigerators. This attack was not specifically directed at healthcare 
organisations, yet the damage was widespread. Other ransomware has specifically targeted the 
healthcare sector. Mansfield-Devine reports that between 2015 and 2016, half of UK NHS trusts 
were hit by some form of ransomware [33]. While US media highlighted the case of the Hollywood 
Presbyterian Medical Centre shut down for 10 days until it paid a $17,000 ransom; in an attack 
thought to have originated from a phishing email [34]. 
Other malware attacks have led to major incidents, for example one UK healthcare trust suffered an 
unspecified cyberattack which led to the shutdown of its IT systems and cancellation of almost all 
planned operations and outpatient appointments for four days [35]. Another attack known as 
Medjack (“Medical Device Hijack”) is an exploit that injects malware into unprotected medical 
devices to move laterally across the hospital network [36]. Infected medical devices created weak 
links in hospital security defences, including diagnostic equipment (e.g., MRI machines), therapeutic 
equipment (e.g., infusion pumps) and life support equipment (e.g., ventilators). This equipment had 
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5not been previously identified as a launchpad for wider attacks. Infection can then spread to other 
devices, for instance to a nurse’s workstation - which has access to medical records and internet 
access to send the data to the attackers. 
‘White hacker’ simulated attacks have highlighted that other vulnerabilities exist which mean that 
“Medical devices are the next security nightmare” [37]. There is potential for attacks akin to what 
was previously regarded as science fiction. For example, brainjacking – if it became possible to insert 
an appropriate device [38]. Simulated attacks have been made on devices including pacemakers and 
defibrillators [39], insulin pumps [40–42] and drug infusion pumps. These attacks have remotely 
manipulated devices to alter operation or send fatal drug doses. While currently only simulated, 
these attacks could happen in reality [43]. Risks will continue to grow if cybersecurity is not designed 
in from the beginning of the product or project lifecycle.  
What is the role of legislation and standards?
The US Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 [44] implemented safeguards to 
ensure that certain electronic health information is protected. The Security Rule requires covered 
entities to maintain reasonable and appropriate administrative, technical, and physical safeguards to 
ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of EHRs that they create, receive, maintain or 
transmit. 
The upcoming General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) also comes into effect in the UK in May 
2018. The GDPR is designed to harmonise data privacy laws across Europe to protect against privacy 
and data breaches [45]. The GDPR aims to accomplish this by addressing gaps in the current 
legislation, which was released in the 1990s prior to organisations holding vast electronic data. The 
GDPR applies to all personal data held by an organisation. As part of the new legislation, ‘all 
breaches which may result in a risk to peoples’ rights and freedoms’ must be reported to the 
Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO). Breaches of health data would likely fall into this category, 
therefore they will need to be reported to the ICO within 72 hours of the breach occurring. Non-
compliance risks fines of up to €20m. Other changes include the need for all practices to have a data 
protection officer and the introduction of extra ‘transparency and fair processing’ legislation which 
need to be included in patient privacy notices [45]. This new legislation will significantly increase the 
cost of breaches (due to implemented fines) and may help to increase awareness around privacy 
issues and the need for improved cybersecurity. As the NHS moves towards its aspiration of EHRs – 
there are concerns around patient privacy and consent and the sharing of data with other 
organisations [46]. As part of the national data opt-out scheme, patients must be given the choice to 
opt out of their personal data being shared for purposes other than their individual care. Under the 
GDPR, any request for data from an external organisation must be given in clear and easily accessible 
language, including the purpose for requiring the data. This will allow clinicians to uphold patients’ 
data preferences. That said, it has been suggested that changes in infrastructure are required before 
EHRs will becoming a useful reality. This is due to the NHS using different providers and different 
systems, for example two labs may measure the same thing using very different scales; making it 
difficult for two separate labs to share data in any meaningful fashion [46].
When it comes to medical devices, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) places responsibility 
for cybersecurity with the medical product manufacturer. The FDA has published premarket [47] and 
postmarket guidelines [48] that contain recommendations for management of medical device 
cybersecurity risks throughout the product life cycle. This includes encouraging people to report 
cybersecurity issues and making it mandatory for manufacturers and device user facilities to report 
any device malfunction if it poses a risk to health.
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6European regulators have published high-level cybersecurity 
recommendations for industries including medical devices involved 
in the Internet of Things (IoT) paradigm. The recommendations are 
partially intended to help companies meet upcoming European data 
privacy requirements under the GDPR. How can the healthcare 
sector move forward?
There is no 100% effective way to prevent all cybersecurity breaches but cybersecurity must form 
part of the risk management process and cyber resilience must be ensured. Cyber resilience is a 
holistic view of cyber risk, which looks at culture, people and processes, as well as technology [49]. 
Several factors have been identified as a means to improve the situation:
As a minimum, basic cyber-hygiene must be maintained, see the 10 steps from the National Cyber 
Security Centre [50]. This includes regular, secure backups (essential to maintain resilience and be 
able to recover quickly if attacked) and keeping software up to date to ensure security patches are in 
place. Confidentiality must be maintained. This can be achieved through anonymization of data 
(including images), removal of patient identifiers when used for research purposes, and limiting 
access to online patient information. This requires investing in systems and processes which support 
secure data transfer (e.g., e-mail encryption and protection of online data).  
Security must be a core part of the product lifecycle. This requires considering the trade-offs 
between security and other requirements from the start[51]. Appropriate incentives should ensure 
that future devices and networks have robust security designed in from the start and that these are 
not added later in a ‘bolt on’ fashion. This could be driven by security standards for information 
management, which take into consideration the unique healthcare context that tends to prioritise 
availability over confidentiality. Any standards, regulations or rules must ease burdensomeness and 
prevent temptation for staff to engage in insecure workarounds. 
Cybersecurity should be a key part of patient care culture as convenient and insecure processes 
must be replaced with more secure, substantive approaches. This means not simply being seen to be 
secure (for example to comply with regulations) but building security into the culture.  Levin & 
Christmann [52] point out that this may require active inspections and enforcement from accredited 
bodies. Culture change must be from the top-down and metrics should be applied through the Care 
Quality Commission [53] or similar to ensure effective engagement. An effective security culture has 
the potential to enhance employees acting in effect as a ‘human firewall’ that can help to protect 
electronic assets. This includes staff not being logged in as a domain administrator; no sharing of 
login credentials; and regular staff training to communicate the risks presented by lax security 
behaviours and how security can be attained without compromising patient care. It is possible that 
more sophisticated security logins (e.g., retinal imaging, fingerprints, face identification) could be 
used to prevent the sharing of logins and passwords. The recruitment of security personnel is also 
required. 
Cyber-insurance is a rapidly growing business with estimated global sales of $7.5 billion by 2020 [49]. 
With the losses associated with cyber breaches, more companies are turning towards insurance. 
Security improvements may be driven through appropriate insurance incentives. Protection against 
the consequences of cyberattacks may be part of the liabilities insured against in the same way as 
hospitals are insured against claims of criminal negligence [53]
Ponemon Institute [31] suggests the cost of a data breach could be reduced through participation in 
threat sharing. This could be facilitated through national support for incident reporting and 
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7management. For instance in the UK, a Care CERT has been set up [54]. However, a joined up 
approach to the creation of local and national response plans for major cyber-incidents should be in 
place [55].
Limitations of this review
Due to the scope of this review, only English publications were included for analysis. Future work 
should seek to broaden this further. Whilst we acknowledge that viewpoints and commentaries are 
not scientific evidence, this is where the majority of information around healthcare technology 
currently lies. Therefore, this approach was deemed appropriate to provide an overall view of the 
current body of knowledge, the key issues around health technology security and to highlight areas 
for moving forward.
Conclusions
While healthcare technologies play key roles in our population’s health they are vulnerable to 
security threats due to interconnected, easily accessible access points, outdated systems, and a lack 
of emphasis upon cybersecurity. Focus has tended to be placed upon patient care, however 
healthcare technologies hold vast amounts of valuable, sensitive data. In many cases financial gain is 
the motivation for attacks, as medical identity is more valuable than other identity credentials. Other 
attacks may be motivated by political gain, even cyberwarfare. However if critical health systems are 
attacked, human lives are at risk. An attack could result in loss of functioning of critical equipment 
within hospitals such as intensive care units or even at home where interventions rely on power 
such as nebulisers [56].
The escalation of ransomware attacks on hospitals can bring whole health systems to a standstill as 
seen in both the UK and US [57,58]. Concern has been further increased by ‘White Hacker’ 
identification of health technology security weaknesses, which suggest that the remote 
manipulation of medical devices such as pace makers and insulin pumps is an unnerving possibility. 
Cybersecurity is an essential part of maintaining the safety, privacy and trust of patients. More 
money and effort must be invested into ensuring the security of healthcare technologies and patient 
information. Security must be designed into the product from conception and not be an 
afterthought. Cybersecurity must become part of the patient care culture. 
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